Interessant RAND studie/rapport uit 2019 ook wat betreft Armenië en Azerbaijan
The United States is locked in a great-power competition with Russia. What are Russia's greatest anxieties and vulnerabilities? How can the United States exploit these vulnerabilities? And what are the potential costs and risks of doing so?
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Going by the playbook en Kremlin trapt er met open ogen in oftewel Kremlin heeft het zeer makkelijk gemaakt. Vanaf pagina 96 tot 136
Perhaps the most literal way to extend Russia would be to increase
the costs of its foreign commitments. As early as the 1940s, George
Kennan—the father of containment—suggested that the Soviet Union
was already overextended and that the military, economic, and politi-
cal costs of sustaining its empire would ultimately be one of the factors
leading to the reform or collapse of the Communist system.
Russia today is far less extended than the old Soviet Union. Its
domestic population is much more homogeneous, with ethnic Rus-
sians composing more than 77 percent of its population.1 Its exter-
nal commitments are far more limited, comprising only small bits of
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and a larger portion of Syria. It does
face active opposition, however, in both Eastern Ukraine and Syria.
The United States has provided limited support to Russia’s opponents
in both countries and might do more, thereby driving up Russian costs.
Proxy competition of this sort is not new. Indeed, the “great game”
characterized interstate relations for several centuries, as aspirant global
powers clashed over conflicting spheres of influence. The renewal of
such maneuvering marks a return to a form of geopolitical competition
that some analysts argue took a brief hiatus after the end of the Cold
War, when the United States was left as the lone superpower and the
ideology of liberal democracy seemed to reign supreme.
This chapter describes six possible U.S. moves in the current geo-
political competition: providing lethal arms to Ukraine, resuming sup-
port to the Syrian rebels, promoting regime change in Belarus, exploit-
ing Armenian and Azeri tensions, intensifying attention to Central
Asia, and isolating Transnistria (a Russian-occupied enclave within
Moldova). There are several other possible geopolitical moves discussed
in other RAND research but not directly evaluated here—including
intensifying NATO’s relationship with Sweden and Finland, pressur-
ing Russia’s claims in the Arctic, and checking Russia’s attempts to
expand its influence in Asia.
Intensifying the challenge to Russian military presence and opera-
tions abroad could have several consequences. It might cause Russia to
withdraw from some of these commitments, which could be an impor-
tant win for the United States but would do the opposite of extend-
ing Russia—causing it, rather, to contract, perhaps to a more defensible
perimeter. Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria are drains on the Russian
treasury and defense budget. Alternatively, and more likely, Russia might
escalate, possibly seizing more of Ukraine, supporting further advances
of the Damascus regime, or actually occupying a wavering Belarus. Such
moves would likely impose serious additional strains on Russian defense
and economic capacity, but would also represent a serious setback for
U.S. policy. Given this range of possible responses, any U.S. moves of the
sort described in this chapter would need to be carefully calibrated and
pursued within some larger policy framework.