Ik denk een realistische beschrijving van de toestand van het Russisch leger. Via deeptranslate dus kwaliteit van de vertaling is niet super.
Als het gaat zoals hij het beschrijft dan zal de oorlog wel eens rap voorbij kunnen zijn. Tenzij Rusland voor een volledige mobilisatie gaat en dat zou eens de val van Poetin kunnen betekenen.
The saddest consequence for us of a Ukrainian "offensive", which we will most likely be able to repel in most places, will be that our generals, who will be reported as having slaughtered a billion Ukrops (adding a zero on each level of reports), will decide "Aha! We have knocked out all their reserves! It's about time we went on the offensive ourselves!".
"The offensive is, in general, a show-take for the West, to show, so to speak, that we, and we Ukrainians, are also ready to fight to our last self! Just give us money and weapons, Heavenly Gods! King Julian will get his money and weapons in the end.
But we are, in this case, about the "side story". About how the claimed "piles of cut-up dill" will impress our society of anonymous warlords, and it will decide it's safe to go on the offensive. And will throw in the offensive all the remnants of infantry and poorly prepared reserves. There are not and will not be sufficiently trained motorized and tank reserves to represent any kind of encirclement operation, so they will try to throw in anything they can get their hands on, trying to compensate for the sad average quality and even sadder average controllability of our infantry on the battlefield.
You see, the situation when, for example, in DNR our people are firing from "Hyacinth" against Ukrainian AGS can be presented to "patriotic press" readers as "overwhelming fire superiority", but a professional will scratch his head at such news. What they mean is.
a. the infantry is increasingly unable to use its own heavy group weapon (which has already been written about, and not even by me, I quoted Stas Varg)
b. Battalion 120mm mortars and brigade artillery groups are unable to support their infantry for one reason or another (training/fire accuracy, communications/interaction or something else)
c. The resource of our longest 152 mm barrels is burnt out on the pettiness instead of counter-battery on "three axes" and other more significant targets than AGS.
When I receive information from the RF about how many new "dozvolbat" are being formed there, my hair stands on end. It immediately begs the question "Where will you get the chiefs of communications for these battalions? And there are none. There aren't. Just recently in one of the great chat rooms I was looking for a very combat-ready, in general, unit chief of communications at just about the battalion level. I'm not the only liaison officer in this chat, we all said in unison - "There are no liaison officers and there will never be any! And one of my colleagues added "You take a fetus yourself and grow as much as you can".
And what will these Dobbs be without a working 24/7 digital closed circuit radio? An unmanageable mob of deer that the Ukranians, actively playing "from defence", will very quickly be sent to cemeteries and hospitals. What will be the advance of the "Third Corps" made famous by Shurygin, the state of communications in which it is useless to describe to those who have not seen it - people simply will not believe that it happens? And it does, it does. The Corps will be a huge, monstrous uncontrollable mob of deer.
It's all useless to tell people who haven't seen such things performed by our military in person. I mean, I've seen Debal, and I'm not laughing at this circus and I'm not surprised at all. I have seen tanks going to war with empty containers of dynamic protection, I have seen the people who came to work yesterday and today they are already given machine guns and grenade launchers, they choose three separated from them, a platoon leader and they go to war. We were led there by three officers - a medic, a liaison officer and a seriously wounded deputy commander, a 60-year-old Astrakhan Cossack, who was carried in the troop compartment of the BMP, in the turret of which I was riding, figuring how I, with one disabled arm, would pull Petrovich out of the troop compartment if we got hit.
I have seen many things then and before and after that people will never believe until they have seen and participated in them. (Whoever thinks their profanity is incomplete, I highly recommend refilling a tank battalion with buckets on ice at speed as a means to do so.)
And 1 AK and 2 AKs of January 2015, they had at least some backbone of people not just trained people, but people with combat experience of summer-autumn 2014. And Debal ended up being a three-week meat grinder. And the enemy was the Ukrainian armed forces of the same year, not unlike the current ones. But... Then the magic pen of the same Shurygin turned the three-week meat grinder into a three-day network-centric success, for which there was a queue (in reality, on the contrary, a lot of those who got into the officers "through graft", for good salaries in dollars, In reality - on the contrary - a lot of those who got into officers through "pulling strings" and good salaries in dollars, and who were already clad in "pixel", were writing reports on the nearest card in the same barracks, in which here, with them, trembling with fear, wicked simple men "without connections", in slides and "flora", were filling their bands and checking the iron before the battle).
In general, if the offensive itch of our military, reinforced by the political leadership, prevails, then after the inevitable in this case sad and pointless autumn massacre, in winter we will face a choice - either another monstrously shameful and obviously unsuccessful search for peace, or mobilization in Russia. Of course there will be disgrace first and then mobilization after all. This is the only way our top brass can do it. Mobilization in the Russian Federation is actually the last chance to stop such massacres, because our generals will shit themselves by stacking conscripts. These are not the Donetsk and Luhansk men, who to them are disenfranchised "unaccountables".
If our society of anonymous warlords really arranges an "active autumn", then our winter will be a very tough remake of the 2015-2021 "positionalism", when on our part the ability to successfully respond to enemy shelling will no longer be limited by the "Minsk agreements", but by a lack of BK, the deplorable state of artillery in general and the skillful counter-battery work of the enemy. What an arse it will be with supplies and transport is a very sad story in its own right. Even now the volunteers, using the money they have raised, have to buy convoys of all-terrain vehicles, Nivs and UAZis, drive them into the republics and distribute them among the most needy units. And now, in summer, by some miracle, the trucks that will not go anywhere on the muddy tracks in autumn and winter are still on the road. In any military convoy, the LPR and DNR MM trucks can still be easily distinguished from Russian military vehicles by their completely bald tires, and the running gear and engines are still repaired by the troops at their own expense. And winter and autumn will ask...
www.demorgen.be
www.independent.co.uk
p.dw.com
